Gov Adeleke’s Headship Of President Tinubu’s Campaign Council in Osun: Matters Arising And The Way Forward- Shuaib Oyedokun
Can the APC in Osun State successfully mobilise its members and other residents of the state to deliver votes for President Bola Ahmed Tinubu in 2027 under a campaign structure coordinated by Governor Ademola Adeleke, who defeated the party’s candidate in the August 15 governorship election?
The issue is not simply whether Governor Adeleke has declared support for President Tinubu. It is whether the proposed arrangement can translate that declaration into votes without alienating the APC’s established political structure, demoralising its members, or undermining the electoral prospects of its National Assembly and other candidates.
I believe there is a pragmatic way forward. However, it requires clarity of authority, an agreed division of responsibilities, measurable targets and, above all, respect for the APC’s existing political base.
1. MATTER ARISING: THE OSUN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN STRUCTURE
The following is my assessment of the situation and a proposed action plan.
A. The fundamental contradiction
There are three political realities that the national leadership must recognise.
First, Governor Adeleke’s declaration of support for President Tinubu is a political opportunity.
If his declaration is sincere and translates into actual votes, it could benefit the President in Osun State. The APC should not dismiss this possibility merely because Adeleke belongs to another political camp.
Second, the APC possesses an established political constituency of its own.
You have referred to the 444,815 votes gotten by the APC in the August 15 governorship election, compared with Governor Adeleke’s 511,067 votes.
These figures, as you have presented them, illustrate the existence of a substantial APC electoral base that cannot prudently be ignored.
However, the governorship election results should not be treated as a perfect forecast of presidential voting. Presidential elections have different dynamics, and voters may support candidates from different parties at different electoral levels.
The central question, therefore, is how to preserve, consolidate and expand the APC’s established support while attracting additional voters through the governor’s declared commitment.
Third, the proposed campaign leadership could create a crisis of confidence within the APC.
If APC members who contested and lost the governorship election are suddenly expected to work under the political direction of the person who defeated them, without consultation or explanation, the result could be resentment, withdrawal from campaign activities and passive resistance.
That would be an unfortunate outcome: a structure intended to strengthen the President’s chances could inadvertently weaken the party’s own mobilisation machinery.
My conclusion is that the national leadership must distinguish between attracting new political support and displacing the existing party organisation. The former is desirable; the latter is dangerous.
2. SHOULD THE APC AND GOVERNOR ADELEKE’S POLITICAL CAMP WORK INDEPENDENTLY OR THROUGH A HARMONISED STRUCTURE?
This is the most important organizational question.
I would recommend a harmonised presidential campaign with two operational wings and clearly defined responsibilities.
Neither complete separation nor the immediate absorption of the APC into a governor-led structure offers the best solution.
Option One: Two independent campaign structures
Under this arrangement, the APC would maintain its established campaign machinery, while Governor Adeleke and his political associates would organise their own mobilisation for President Tinubu.
Advantages
- APC members retain their identity, dignity and established chain of command.
- The governor’s supporters can mobilise voters through their own networks.
- Each wing can be assessed according to its actual contribution.
- Disagreements within one wing need not paralyse the other.
Disadvantages
- Rival structures could compete for recognition and resources.
- Conflicting messages might confuse voters.
- There could be duplication of campaign activities.
- Both groups might claim credit for the same electoral results.
This arrangement is safer for internal party morale but requires an effective coordinating mechanism.
Option Two: One harmonised campaign structure under the governor
This would place the APC and the governor’s political camp under one operational leadership, with Adeleke serving as state coordinator.
Advantages
- It could present a united front behind President Tinubu.
- It might attract voters who are not traditionally aligned with the APC.
- It could simplify the coordination of statewide presidential campaign activities.
Disadvantages
- APC members could interpret the arrangement as a reward for defeating their party.
- Established party leaders and candidates might feel politically marginalised.
- The governor’s supporters could dominate campaign appointments and resources.
- The arrangement could become a vehicle for negotiating future political offices rather than concentrating on the presidential election.
The principal danger is that the APC could be expected to provide its existing electoral machinery while another political camp receives the public recognition and organisational authority.
Option Three: A harmonised structure with two operational wings — my recommendation
This offers the best balance.
The state campaign should have:
- A joint presidential campaign leadership, responsible for the common objective of securing votes for President Tinubu.
- An APC operational wing, responsible for mobilising registered party members, established supporters and the party’s existing ward and local government networks.
- A governor-led support wing, responsible for bringing additional supporters into the presidential campaign.
- A joint monitoring and evaluation unit, responsible for verifying voter mobilisation, campaign activity and polling-unit performance.
The governor’s political network should not be dismissed, but neither should it automatically replace the APC’s established organisation.
The two wings should cooperate towards one presidential objective while maintaining clearly understood responsibilities.
The principle should be unity of purpose without compulsory uniformity of political identity.
3. HOW CAN THE CLAIM OF 1.5 MILLION VOTES BE TESTED?
The reported ambition to deliver 1.5 million votes for President Tinubu should be treated as a target requiring evidence, not merely as a political declaration.
If the governor claims he can deliver that number, the appropriate response is neither ridicule nor unquestioning acceptance. It is to ask for a credible mobilisation plan.
The national leadership should request a written electoral delivery framework covering the following areas.
| Requirements | Questions to be answered |
| Electoral baseline | What was the governor’s actual support base in previous elections, and how transferable is it to the presidential contest? |
| Additional voters | How many voters outside his established political base can he realistically attract? |
| APC contribution | What is the independently assessed mobilisation capacity of the APC’s existing structures? |
| Local government targets | What realistic presidential vote target is proposed for each local government? |
| Ward-level mobilisation | Who will be responsible for contacting, persuading and mobilising voters in each ward? |
| Polling-unit monitoring | How will campaign readiness, turnout and the integrity of the process be monitored? |
| Accountability | Who will report progress, and how frequently will the campaign leadership review performance? |
A target of 1.5 million votes must be tested against the total number of registered voters, expected turnout, previous election results and the practical capacity of the campaign to persuade voters.
It should also be recognised that votes are not the personal property of any politician. The governor may influence voters, just as APC leaders may influence their supporters, but neither can guarantee that individuals will vote as instructed.
Consequently, the campaign should focus on measurable mobilisation rather than personal assurances.
A practical proposal
Each operational wing should prepare its own ward-by-ward assessment.
The joint campaign leadership should then consolidate these assessments into a single state plan, identifying:
- The existing APC support base.
- The additional voters the governor’s camp expects to attract.
- Areas where both networks overlap.
- Areas where either wing lacks an effective organisation.
- The resources and activities required to achieve the agreed targets.
This would allow the national leadership to assess the governor’s contribution objectively without undermining the APC’s existing strength.
4. HOW SHOULD THE INTERESTS OF APC NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CANDIDATES BE PROTECTED?
This is a critical matter.
A presidential alliance does not automatically translate into an alliance for the Senate, House of Representatives or State House of Assembly elections.
Governor Adeleke could genuinely support President Tinubu while his political associates support candidates from their own political camp in other contests. Conversely, APC supporters could vote for the President while remaining loyal to APC candidates.
Such split-ticket voting is possible, and the campaign must plan for it.
I recommend four safeguards.
A. Separate presidential cooperation from other electoral contests
The campaign should establish a clear understanding that cooperation on the presidential election does not, by itself, determine the political arrangements for other elective offices.
The APC should continue to develop and promote its candidates through its own legitimate party structures.
B. Protect candidates’ access to the party organisation
APC candidates should retain access to ward leaders, local government structures, party supporters and campaign resources allocated to their respective contests.
Their mobilisation should not depend entirely on the goodwill of a state presidential campaign coordinator from another political camp.
C. Establish a ‘candidate consultation forum’
The state campaign leadership should convene a meeting involving:
- APC state party leaders.
- APC senate candidates.
- APC House of Representatives candidates.
- APC State House of Assembly candidates.
- Relevant local government and ward representatives.
- Representatives of the governor’s presidential support wing.
This forum should identify possible conflicts between the presidential alliance and the interests of the APC candidates.
The purpose is not to force the governor’s supporters to endorse every APC candidate. It is to prevent the presidential arrangement from inadvertently obstructing the APC’s legitimate electoral activities.
D. Agree on a code of conduct
The code should prohibit the use of the presidential campaign structure to intimidate APC candidates, exclude legitimate party stakeholders or prevent them from campaigning.
It should also establish a process for resolving disputes before they escalate.
The APC must not sacrifice its other electoral contests in exchange for an unverified promise of presidential votes.
5. THE MOST SENSITIVE ISSUE: THE MORALE OF APC MEMBERS AFTER THE GOVERNORSHIP DEFEAT
Our concern about the morale of APC members deserves serious attention.
Political defeat can produce disappointment, suspicion and withdrawal. These reactions become more pronounced when party members believe that their sacrifices have been disregarded or that their opponents are being rewarded at their expense.
The national leadership should not assume that the APC’s supporters will automatically accept a new arrangement simply because it has been announced from above.
I recommend an immediate programme of internal consultation.
First: Convene an APC ‘stakeholder meeting’
The meeting should be attended by the state party leadership, candidates, elected representatives, former officeholders, local government leaders, ward leaders and other influential party stakeholders.
The objectives should be to:
- Explain the purpose of the presidential alliance.
- Clarify the authority and responsibilities of the state campaign coordinator.
- Establish what the arrangement means for the APC candidates.
- Give members an opportunity to express their concerns.
- Agree on safeguards for the party’s future.
Second: Recognise the sacrifices of party members
Those who worked for the APC during the governorship election should not be treated as obstacles to a new political arrangement.
They should be recognised as the foundation upon which the party must continue to build.
The leadership should communicate clearly that supporting President Tinubu does not require APC members to abandon their political identity or surrender their legitimate interests.
Third: Make consultation continuous
One meeting will not resolve every concern.
A standing consultation committee should meet regularly to review campaign progress, receive complaints and recommend solutions.
The objective should be to prevent resentment from becoming organised disengagement.
6. DOES HARMONISATION NECESSARILY MEAN SHARING ELECTIVE OFFICES OR RETURNING TO THE STATUS QUO?
No. Presidential campaign harmonisation does not automatically require the sharing of elective offices.
This distinction must be made clear from the outset.
There are at least three separate questions:
- Who will coordinate the presidential campaign?
- Which political organisations will contribute to President Tinubu’s electoral success?
- How will the APC select, support and promote candidates for other elective offices?
These questions are related, but they are not identical.
Governor Adeleke’s appointment as state presidential campaign coordinator will not by itself establish that the APC has agreed to share elective positions or abandon its candidates.
Equally, the APC should not assume that the governor’s presidential support automatically includes support for every APC candidate.
Any proposed arrangement concerning other offices should be addressed separately, through appropriate party procedures and lawful political agreements.
The national leadership should therefore insist on a clear written understanding of the scope of the alliance.
This would prevent presidential cooperation from being interpreted as an unwritten agreement to return to an earlier political status quo.
7. IS OSUN HEADING TOWARDS A ONE-PARTY POLITICAL MODEL?
The possibility of a one-party model in Osun State raises an important democratic question.
A political arrangement in which the governor, the presidential campaign leadership and the dominant political organisation operate through a common platform might appear to promote administrative harmony.
However, political cooperation should not be confused with the elimination of legitimate political competition.
A healthy democracy allows parties to cooperate on issues of common interest while competing for public office.
In Osun, the APC and the governor’s political camp could support the same presidential candidate while retaining distinct political identities and competing for other offices.
That arrangement is not inherently contradictory.
Indeed, it could encourage cooperation across party lines without requiring the APC to surrender its independent organisation.
The danger arises if harmonisation is used to marginalise opposition voices, weaken party structures or discourage legitimate electoral competition.
The objective should be cross-party cooperation where interests coincide, not the forced disappearance of political differences.
Osun needs political stability, effective governance and development. None of these requires the suppression of legitimate political pluralism.
8. A PRAGMATIC AND RESULT-ORIENTED ACTION PLAN
I would recommend the following seven-point programme to the APC national leadership.
| No. | Recommended action | Purpose |
| 1 | Convene an urgent meeting of Osun APC stakeholders and candidates. | Restore confidence and establish internal consultation. |
| 2 | Obtain written clarification of the state campaign coordinator’s mandate. | Prevent confusion over authority and responsibility. |
| 3 | Establish an APC presidential mobilisation wing alongside the governor’s support wing. | Preserve the party’s existing organisation while attracting new voters. |
| 4 | Prepare independently assessed ward-by-ward electoral targets. | Test the credibility of projected votes and identify mobilisation gaps. |
| 5 | Protect the organisational interests of APC candidates for all other elective offices. | Prevent presidential cooperation from undermining other contests. |
| 6 | Establish a joint monitoring, reporting and dispute-resolution mechanism. | Promote accountability and prevent organisational conflict. |
| 7 | Review campaign performance at agreed intervals and adjust the strategy accordingly. | Ensure that the arrangement produces measurable results rather than political headlines. |
These steps should be initiated well before the formal campaign period so that the presidential campaign is not forced to resolve internal disagreements when electoral mobilisation should already be under way.
9. WHAT SHOULD THE APC NATIONAL LEADERSHIP DO IMMEDIATELY?
I would urge the national leadership to address three questions before the new structure becomes fully operational.
First: What specific responsibilities have been assigned to Governor Adeleke, and what authority does he have over the existing APC campaign organisation?
Second: What institutional guarantees will protect APC members, candidates and party structures from marginalisation?
Third: What verifiable evidence supports the projected presidential votes, and how will the governor’s contribution be measured independently?
The answers should be communicated to relevant Osun APC stakeholders.
This is not a demand to reject the governor’s participation. It is a demand to make the arrangement workable.
A political alliance that begins with clarity and consultation is more likely to succeed than one imposed without adequate explanation.
10. MY FINAL ADVICE: SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT DISMANTLING THE PARTY
The APC in Osun faces a delicate political balancing act.
It must support President Tinubu’s re-election, remain open to additional political alliances, rebuild the confidence of members after the governorship defeat and protect the legitimate interests of its candidates.
These objectives are compatible, provided the campaign is organised intelligently.
I would not recommend rejecting Governor Adeleke’s participation merely because he defeated the APC in the governorship election. If his support can attract additional presidential votes, it should be welcomed.
But I would equally reject the assumption that his appointment should automatically place the APC’s established machinery under his unrestricted political control.
The best arrangement is a harmonised presidential campaign with clearly defined operational wings, measurable responsibilities, transparent reporting and firm protection for the APC’s independent party structures and candidates.
The governor should be encouraged to demonstrate the strength of his declared support. The APC should be encouraged to consolidate its own electoral base. Both should be judged by their contributions to the presidential objective, rather than by the titles they hold.
Above all, the APC’s national leadership should remember that party members who have experienced electoral defeat are not expendable political assets. They remain essential to the party’s future.
The ultimate test is not who occupies the campaign leadership position, but whether the arrangement delivers credible additional votes for President Tinubu while preserving the APC’s capacity to compete effectively in every other election.
If I were advising the relevant APC leadership, my immediate recommendation would be simple: convene a meeting that will be attended by stakeholders in Osun State APC , clarify the governor’s mandate, establish a dual-wing campaign structure and protect the interests of all APC candidates before the campaign machinery becomes fully operational- Alhaji Shuaib Afolabi Oyedokun, an APC chieftain, writes from Inisa, Osun State
